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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to
Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) UTAH CODE ANNOT.

Plaintiff/Appellant

originally filed this appeal with the Utah Supreme Court, but that
court poured this matter over to this Court on July 31, 1990
pursuant to Rule 42(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Pursuant to Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure, Defendant/Respondent First Security herein sets forth
its Statement of Issues Presented for Review.
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside order of dismissal when Meadow
Fresh's counsel and Meadow Fresh were both advised of the hearing
on the order to show cause and failed to appear or otherwise show
good cause for not dismissing the matter?
2.

In the event this Court renders an advisory opinion

on the effect of Section 78-12-40 Utah Code Annot., whether Utah's
savings statute allows more than one refiling period following
successive dismissals of a matter other than on the merits?
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Rule 4-103 Utah Code of Judicial Administration-Civil
Calendar Management.
(2) If a certificate of readiness for trial has not
been served and filed within 180 days of the filing date
and absent a showing of good cause, the court shall

dismiss the case without prejudice for lack of
prosecution.
§ 78-12-40 UTAH CODE ANNOT.
If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the
plaintiff fails in such action or upon cause of action
otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited
either by law or contract for commencing the same shall
have expired/ the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause
of action survives, his representatives, may commence a
new action within one year after the reversal or failure.
Rule 41(b) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
For failure of the plaintiff to prosecute or to
comply with these rules or any order of court, a
defendant may move for dismissal of an action or of any
claim against him. . . .
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Proceedings Below
Plaintiff/Appellant Meadow Fresh Farms, Inc. ("Meadow
Fresh") originally commenced its action against these defendants
by filing a complaint against Defendants/Respondents on April 25,
1983.

(R. at 205-221).

That case was dismissed on September 27,

1985 by Judge Scott Daniels of the Third District Court for Meadow
Fresh's failure to prosecute.

(R. at 246). On March 13, 1987

Judge Daniels denied Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside the
September 27, 1985 order of dismissal.

(R. at 255-59).

Meadow Fresh appealed Judge Daniel's denial of the motion
to set the dismissal aside.

On May 27, 1987, the Utah Supreme

Court summarily disposed of Meadow Fresh's appeal and affirmed
Judge Daniel's dismissal of the original complaint.
-2-

(R. at

261-62).

Its order stated, "The grounds for review are so

insubstantial that they do not merit further review."
12, 1988, Meadow Fresh filed its lawsuit again.

On January

(R. at 2-19).

Nearly one year later, on December 5, 1989, Judge Frederick issued
an Order to Show Cause pursuant to Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of
Judicial Administration and mailed a copy to Meadow Fresh's
counsel, citing Meadow Fresh's failure to prosecute its lawsuit as
grounds for dismissal.

(R. at 165). Although both Meadow Fresh

and its counsel were aware of the hearing, neither Meadow Fresh
nor its counsel appeared at the hearing on the Order to Show
Cause, and Judge Frederick entered his Order of Dismissal on
January 18, 1990.

(R. at 180).

On February 22, 1990 Meadow Fresh moved the trial court
for an order to set aside this second dismissal of Meadow Fresh's
complaint for failure to prosecute.

(R. at 189-90).

After

receiving memoranda from all parties and after considering the
matter, Judge Frederick denied Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside
his order of dismissal on May 22, 1990.

(R. at 481-82).

It is

from that Order that Meadow Fresh appeals.
Statement of the Facts
The law firm of Harris & Chambers (now Preston &
Chambers) represented Meadow Fresh at all times from January 12,
1988 to January 9, 1990. This is demonstrated by the following
pleadings of record:
-3-

1.

Mr. B.H. Harris withdrew from personal

representation of Meadow Fresh because of a judicial appointment
on December 14, 1988.

Nothing in his withdrawal indicated his

firm was withdrawing from representation.
2.

(R. at 163).

On December 22, 1988, after Mr. Harris1 withdrawal,

Mr. Harris1 former law firm, then under the name of Preston &
Chambers, continued to represent Meadow Fresh in the case and
responded to outstanding interrogatories on behalf of Meadow Fresh
and certified the same to the court.
3.

(R. at 167).

On January 12, 1989, nearly one month after the law

firm of Preston & Chambers claims it withdrew from representing
Meadow Fresh, a stipulation executed by Preston & Chambers on
behalf of Meadow Fresh was filed with the trial court.

(R. at

175-77).
4.

The law firm of Preston & Chambers did not withdraw

from Meadow Fresh's representation until January 9, 1990.

(R. at

171-172).
The President of Meadow Fresh, Mr. Roy Brog, was made
aware of the Order to Show Cause hearing in December, 1989.
On May 14, 1990 Meadow Fresh filed its lawsuit a third
time, which complaint was dismissed by reason of the pendency of
this appeal.

See Addenda to Brief of Appellant Meadow Fresh.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

This Court should affirm the trial court's denial of
-4-

Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside the order of dismissal. The
first time Meadow Fresh appealed such a denial, the Utah Supreme
Court affirmed the denial of Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside
the first order of dismissal without considering the matter of
sufficient moment to even require briefing.

The policy and

equitable reasons for effectively affirming the second dismissal
of Meadow Fresh's claims for its failure to prosecute them are
even greater now than they were at the time the Utah Supreme Court
summarily disposed of Meadow Fresh's first appeal of such a
dismissal.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure has committed to the
sound discretion of the trial court the decision of whether an
order of dismissal should be set aside.
abuse of that discretion.

Meadow Fresh has shown no

Meadow Fresh had adequate opportunity

to appear before the trial court to demonstrate reasons why its
case should not be dismissed, and chose not to do so.

Further,

Meadow Fresh had adequate opportunity to demonstrate a reason why
the order of dismissal should not be set aside, pursuant to Rule
60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Meadow Fresh failed to meet its burden.

In both instances,
After nearly ten years

since Meadow Fresh's claims arose, and after two separate filings
have run their course and have each been dismissed by reason of
Meadow Fresh's dilatory prosecution of its claims, Meadow Fresh
cannot show and has not shown an abuse of the trial court's
-5-

discretion in refusing to set aside its order of dismissal.
Because Meadow Fresh cannot show an abuse of discretion/ this
court should affirm the trial court's decision.
Meadow Fresh has asked this court to render an advisory
opinion on whether, assuming this court allows the order of
dismissal in Meadow Fresh's second case to stand/ Section
78-12-40/ UTAH CODE ANNOT.# would permit a third filing to come
within the one year savings clause of the statute.

In other

words/ Meadow Fresh asks this court to render an opinion that
interprets Utah's savings statute to permit multiple refilings of
claims after multiple dismissals of those same claims/ if those
dismissals are not on the merits.

Rendering such an opinion is

not necessary to resolve the issues on this appeal.

However, the

issue is almost certain to arise should Meadow Fresh file its
complaint a third time.

If this court elects to render an opinion

on whether Utah's savings statute allows multiple filings, this
court should rule that Section 78-12-40/ UTAH CODE ANNOT./ allows
only one opportunity to take advantage of the additional one year
following a non-prejudicial dismissal.

The policies behind

statutes of limitation/ judicial economy/ and finality affording
potential defendants a point in time at which they may rest from
fear of litigation/ combined with the express language of the
statute, all combine to weigh heavily against creating a rule of
law that would allow a cause of action to live forever so long as
-6-

the plaintiff continued to neglect its prosecution and simply
refiled within a year of its repeated dismissals.
ARGUMENT
A.

JUDGE FREDERICK'S DENIAL OF THE MOTION TO SET ASIDE HIS
ORDER OF DISMISSAL WAS NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION,
In Utah, filing a lawsuit imposes obligations upon the

plaintiff.

A plaintiff has obligations to the court as well as to

the defendants that it will pursue its claims vigorously, and
that

the case will not be allowed to languish, burdening both the

court and the defendants.

This is the rationale expressly

underlying Rule 4-103 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration
and Rule 41(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

The strong

public policy against claims having indefinite duration is also
necessarily implied in the many statutes of limitation governing
the timing of when claims must be brought, or lost forever.
Meadow Fresh asks this Court to ignore all of the
policies governing the conduct of plaintiffs in lawsuits, and to
continue the uncertainty under which these defendants have labored
since these claims were first brought nearly eight years ago.

In

that eight years, Meadow Fresh has now twice neglected to
prosecute its claims against the defendants herein.

For the

reason that two judges of the Third District have dismissed Meadow
Fresh's claims, and because Meadow Fresh has failed in its burden
of showing an abuse of discretion, this Court should affirm the
-7-

lower court's denial of Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside the
order of dismissal,
1.

The Trial Court Has Considerable Discretion to
Refuse to Set Aside a Dismissal,

The Utah Supreme Court has held that a trial court is
endowed with considerable latitude of discretion in determining
whether a movant has made a sufficient showing to overcome an
entry of judgment, and that such a determination shall not be
overturned without a clear showing of abuse of that discretion.
Larsen v. Collina, 684 P.2d 52, 54 (Utah 1984).
made no showing of such an abuse.

Meadow Fresh has

Instead, Meadow Fresh has

argued that the danger of a harsh result following an affirmance
of Judge Frederick's decision necessarily implies some kind of
abuse of discretion.

That is not the law.

That a party may

suffer because of a trial court's decision is not a sufficient
reason to warrant reversal, especially when the decision has
expressly been left to the discretion of the trial court, and the
trial court has exercised that discretion after being fully
advised of the facts and the law by all parties.
2.

Meadow Fresh Was Accorded Due Process.

Meadow Fresh claims that it was denied due process
because of inadequate notice of the show cause hearing.
Appellant at 13-15).

(Brief of

This claim is unsupported by the record.

On

December 5, 1989, when the trial court sent notice of the hearing,
-8-

Meadow Fresh was represented by Preston & Chambers, the law firm
to whom the notice was sent*

The fact of Meadow Fresh's

representation is necessarily implied from the wording of B.H.
Harris1 withdrawal as counsel in December, 1988, but more
importantly by two other facts.

First, the law firm of Preston &

Chambers continued to file pleadings for and on behalf of Meadow
Fresh after Mr, Harris' withdrawal, in late December, 1988 and
middle January, 1989.

(R. at 167, 175-77).

Therefore, notice

was sent to Meadow Fresh's counsel, which constitutes notice to
Meadow Fresh.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, Meadow Fresh had
actual notice of the show cause hearing and had opportunity to be
heard, as established by the Affidavit of Roy Brog, filed in
support of Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside the order of
dismissal.

(R. at 183-185.)

Therefore, Meadow Fresh's

constitutional arguments are irrelevant, and without factual
support.
3.

The Westinqhouse Test For Explaining Delays Is Not
Applicable On Appeal Since Meadow Fresh Elected Not
To Araue That Test At The Trial Court.

Meadow Fresh correctly cites this Court to the case of
Westinqhouse Electric SUPPIV CO. V. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 544
P.2d 876 (Utah 1975) as setting forth the primary factors to be
considered in determining whether a plaintiff is justified in
failing to prosecute an action.

However, leaping to a
-9-

consideration of these factors ignores one essential fact.

Meadow

Fresh's opportunity to establish just cause for retaining the case
under the Westinghouse test was at the trial court level, not
now.

Meadow Fresh's opportunity to make any facts weighing

against dismissal of record is past/ and that issue is not
properly before this court.

In spite of Meadow Fresh's and its

counsel's opportunity to apprise the trial court of these factors
at the hearing on the order to show cause# it elected to ignore
that opportunity.

Meadow Fresh failed to meet its burden of

demonstrating justifiable reasons for not dismissing the action at
the proper time and place to the trial court/ and should not now
be allowed to resurrect such reasons.
a.

Even if applied/ Westinghouse is not met.

Even if Meadow Fresh had appeared at the hearing, there
is nothing in the record to suggest that Meadow Fresh's dilatory
prosecution of its claims was justified by any reason.

The

Westinghouse test involves 1) the conduct of the parties; 2) The
opportunities to move the case forward; 3) What difficulties or
prejudice may have been caused to the other side by the delay; and
4) whether injustice may result from the dismissal.

Ijl. at 879.

Applying this four-part test/ the conduct of the parties
element and opportunities to move the case forward element both
weigh heavily in favor of dismissal.

The undisputed facts clearly

show that Meadow Fresh has consistently neglected to prosecute its
-10-

claims, in spite of the opportunities afforded by the intervening
years and the additional time to file its second action afforded
by Section 78-12-40 Utah Code Annot.

As to the third element/

prejudice, the defendants are prejudiced in their abilities to
defend against these claims now by sheer passage of time.
Finally/ examining the fourth element, what injustice is done in
dismissing claims a party has historically refused to prosecute?
The defendants have had to live with the prospect of liability for
nearly 8 years now, not knowing if and when Meadow Fresh may
decide to get serious about its claims. Meadow Fresh has
obviously not considered its claims against the defendants to be
of sufficient merit or import to prosecute them in either of the
two separate actions it has brought.

In light of this conscious

disregard. Meadow Fresh's suggestion that it would be unjust to
affirm the dismissal of its claims is unsupported and
.unsupportable.
In summary, Meadow Fresh has entirely failed in its
burden of showing any cause, let alone good cause, to excuse its
habitual negligence in prosecuting its claims.

Judge Frederick

doubtless took all relevant factors into consideration when he
made his decision to allow the dismissal to stand.

Because Meadow

Fresh has set forth no adequate reason for overturning that
exercise of discretion, this Court should affirm Judge Frederick's
denial of Meadow Fresh's motion to set aside dismissal.
-11-

B.

SHOULD THIS COURT RENDER AN OPINION ON THE AVAILABILITY
OF SECTION 78-12-40 FOR MULTIPLE REFILINGS, IT SHOULD
LIMIT THE EFFECT OF THE SAVINGS STATUTE TO FILINGS WITHIN
THE FIRST ADDITIONAL YEAR ONLY.
Assuming this Court rules in favor of the defendants and

affirms the trial court order, Meadow Fresh asks this Court to
render an advisory opinion on whether it can timely refile its
complaint a third time.

Because a consideration of this issue is

not necessary to rule upon the denial of the motion to set aside
dismissal, any opinion on the savings statute issue would be
advisory.
However, Meadow Fresh is correct in stating that if it
files its complaint a third time, these defendants will assert
statute of limitation defenses based upon an interpretation of the
Utah saving statute which limits the "saving" of a cause of action
to the year following the first non-prejudicial dismissal only.
Should this Court determine that the circumstances merit rendering
an opinion on the availability of Section 78-12-40 Utah Code
Annot. to more than one additional filing period, this Court
should reject Meadow Fresh's arguments and rule that Utah's
savings statute affords only one additional filing period of one
year after a non-prejudicial dismissal other than on the merits
and outside of the otherwise applicable statute of limitations.
1.

The One Year Savings Statute Does Not A P P I V TO A
Third Suit Brought More Than One Year After The
Dismissal Of The First Suit.

Meadow Fresh has alleged three causes of action against
-12-

the defendants in this action - negligence, interference in
business, and disparagement.

The applicable statute of

limitations is contained in § 78-12-25, UTAH CODE ANNOT., giving
Meadow Fresh four years within which to bring its causes of
action.

The acts of which plaintiff complains took place in the

months of May, June, and September, 1981.

(R. at 2-19).

If

Meadow Fresh were to file a third action, it would file its
complaint approximately ten years after the acts complained of.
For the following reasons, Meadow Fresh's claims are not saved by
§ 78-12-40, and this Court should render an opinion making clear
the applicability of the savings statute only to filings within
the year following the first non-prejudicial dismissal.
a.

This Court should construe § 78-12-40 to allow
only one tolling or "saving".

It is undisputed, and the record of Meadow Fresh's two
filings in the Third District Court, C83-3163 and C88-00171, both
establish that Meadow Fresh filed its original action within the
applicable statute of limitations, which action was dismissed, as
a final matter, when the Utah Supreme Court affirmed Judge
Daniel's denial of the motion to set aside judgment on May 27,
1987.

Meadow Fresh then took advantage of § 78-12-40 by filing

its second action within one year of May 27, 1987.
Section 78-12-40 UTAH CODE ANNOT. states as follows:
If any action is commenced within due time and a
judgment thereon for the plaintiff is reversed, or if the
plaintiff fails in such action or upon a cause of action
-13-

otherwise than on the merits, and the time limited either
by law or contract for commencing the same shall have
expired/ the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause of
action survives, his representatives, may commence a new
action within one year after the removal or failure.
The express language of the statute provides only for Ma"
new action, and refers only to "the" reversal or failure, not to
any new action or to any failure.

Nothing in this statute implies

that a plaintiff like Meadow Fresh may repeatedly bring successive
actions following successive dismissals for year after year,
regardless of the amount of time that has elapsed, and regardless
of the number of dismissals.

Meadow Fresh asks this Court to

interpret the savings statute so that there is no limit to the
number of dismissals and refilings to which a plaintiff may
subject the courts and defendants.

Such an interpretation

directly contradicts the policies of finality and judicial economy.
Although there is no Utah case law on point, other
jurisdictions have held that a plaintiff may not repeatedly
utilize the applicable savings statute after its second action has
been dismissed without prejudice.
In United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Smvden. 53 P.2d 284
(Okla. 1935), the Oklahoma Supreme Court held that a fourth filing
was barred because the applicable savings statute only allowed one
new filing within the extension period.
It is generally held that the privilege conferred by an
enabling provision in the Statute of Limitations may be
exercised but once; that is, that such provision does not
give protection to an indefinite number of actions merely
-14-

because each has been commenced before the period allowed
by the saving clause has expired.
1£. at 286 (citations omitted).

The Smyden court went on to note

that a savings statute does not extend the original limitation
period, but "is only a conditional, limited extension granted
plaintiff. . . .*

Id. at 288. Other courts have similarly ruled

that a savings statute may be used but once. £££, e.g., Hosooai
v. Kadota, 700 P.2d 1327, 1330 (Ariz. 1985) ("A •savings' statute
allows an action, dismissed for reasons unrelated to the merits
after the statute of limitations has expired, to be reinstated if
a second action is filed promptly thereafter.") (emphasis added);
Bush v. Cole, 110 N.E. 1056 (Ohio Ct. App. 1913); Pegfl v,
Cincinnati, N.O. T.P.R. Co. 190 S.W. 458 (Tenn. 1916).
Finally, a recent decision of the Utah Supreme Court
implies that a plaintiff is only entitled to a second filing under
the savings statute, and not to continuous filings.
[W]e have held that if a dismissal of a first action is
appealed, section 78-12-40's extension of time for filing
a second action runs from the date of the dismissal's
affirmance.
Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 245, 254 (Utah 1988) (emphasis added).
If this Court elects to render an opinion, it should rule
that Section 78-12-40 Utah Code Annot. does not permit a plaintiff
more than one exercise of the extraordinary extension of time to
file a complaint provided thereby.

In the instant case, by

waiting until 1987 to seek a vacation of the 1985 dismissal of its
-15-

first action, and re-filing in 1988 after the Supreme Court
affirmed the first dismissal, Meadow Fresh actually had over two
years from the dismissal of its first action to file a second
time.

No reason at law or equity exists to allow Meadow Fresh or

any other plaintiff to file a third time, over four and a half
years after the first dismissal, and years after the original
statute of limitations has run.
CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, these defendants respectfully ask
this Court to affirm the denial of Meadow Fresh's motion to set
aside the January 18, 1990 Order of Dismissal, and, if this Court
elects to render an opinion on the interpretation of Section
78-12-40 Utah Code Annot., to rule that Utah's savings statute
permits only one filing within one year of the first dismissal
other than on the merits.
Respectfullv submitted,

Paul S. J^lt'
Mark 0. Morris
Attorneys for
Defendants/Respondents Utah State
University Dept. of Agriculture
and Applied Science, Von T.
Mendenhall, and Barbara Prater
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